In the years around 1800 two hypotheses led to fundamental discussions in German neuroanatomy and philosophy. The first was developed by Samuel Thomas Soemmerring (1755-1830) in his treatise Uber das Organ der Seele (On the organ of the soul) of 1796, in which he postulated that the organ of the soul was located in the fluid of the cerebral ventricles.' The second was published only two years later by Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) in a short and schematic paper, in which he developed a research programme based on the assumption that several independent organs or faculties of mind were located in the cerebral cortex.2 This was his doctrine of organology, later known as phrenology, although Gall himself never used this term.
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In the years around 1800 two hypotheses led to fundamental discussions in German neuroanatomy and philosophy. The first was developed by Samuel Thomas Soemmerring (1755-1830) in his treatise Uber das Organ der Seele (On the organ of the soul) of 1796, in which he postulated that the organ of the soul was located in the fluid of the cerebral ventricles.' The second was published only two years later by Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) in a short and schematic paper, in which he developed a research programme based on the assumption that several independent organs or faculties of mind were located in the cerebral cortex.2 This was his doctrine of organology, later known as phrenology, although Gall himself never used this term.
In comparing the two, their differences are usually stressed more than their similarities. It has often been argued that Soemmerring's attempt was a late revival of the medieval cell doctrine, an opinion that,'as I will show, is based on a profound misunderstanding of Soemmerring's intentions.3 Looking at the historical approaches 'natural' .8 If we separate philosophy and anatomical methodology, we can show that both viewpoints were part of a complex dispute about the knowledge of human nature. I will argue that Soemmerring and Gall did not agree on the first, but concurred perfectly on the second, with which I will begin.
There is no doubt that both men undertook their research within an anatomical framework. Soemmerring and Gall made far-reaching claims concerning the brain and the soul with the aid of anatomical arguments. Their basic assumption was the positive correlation between structure and function, which means that given functions were implied in given brain structures, and this led to given animal or human behaviour. More specifically, the aspect of quantity, that is the size of a defined part of the brain, was the anatomical explanation for differing behaviour.9
They were therefore criticized by anatomists, who argued against such a leading role for anatomy. The methodological question was whether or not anatomy was competent to deal with problems of localization of function and of the relationships between brain and soul. The dispute was inaugurated mainly by Karl Asmund Rudolphi (1771 Rudolphi ( -1832 , and, to a lesser extent, by Johann Friedrich Meckel (1781-1833).10 Working as professors in Berlin and Halle, both were leading protagonists in anatomy and physiology in the first decades of the nineteenth century and both saw themselves as strict advocates of empirical science. In our context, it is interesting to examine the application of this empirical belief to brain research, and we shall see that it is not useful to reduce the dispute about the brain and the soul to a strict separation between empirical evidence and hypotheses in anatomical research. This reveals an important conceptual difference between the two Prussian anatomists: Rudolphi was much more radical in his criticism and finally abandoned brain research, because his methodological scepticism was linked to a completely different context, within which he was interested in the human soul and behaviour. Meckel, on the other hand, shared methodological principles with Rudolphi, but came to conclusions that allowed him to preserve some of Gall's assumptions.
At this point the other, philosophical level of discussion becomes relevant, namely, whether or not the nature of the human soul is knowable in a physical or only in a metaphysical context. In the late eighteenth century neither Descartes' strict dualism nor La Mettrie's mechanical materialism were accepted as giving satisfactory answers to the questions concerning the presence of the soul in the brain.
Werner Krauss distinguished between two main trends that were constitutive for the discussions on human nature at that time. An "emancipatory" current understood functions of the brain', Isis, 1973, 64: 445-68; idem, ' man as a product within the chain of being. Although this view accepted man's privileged position as the most developed and most noble being, the soul was nevertheless regarded as a variety of life. A more "theological" current, on the contrary, upheld the belief in divine creation and the immortality and indivisibility of the soul, which served to preserve the unity and the freedom of the self." 1 It would be too simple to argue, however, that these two positions solely represented the often-cited querelle des anciens et des modernes. Rather, they expressed a dilemma, which became manifest in the approaches of some protagonists of Enlightenment philosophy. One example is Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who pleaded for those two positions at the same time.12 In his most influential book Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Menschheit (1784-91) he referred to the beginnings of mankind, and in comparing men and apes described the orangutan in an anthropomorphic manner. His passions and vices, Herder continued, made him similar to man, and his thinking power ("Denkungskraft") came close to reason. 13 This comparison was only appropriate, because Herder accepted the relationship between anatomical and morphological development on the one hand, and the advancement of abilities on the other; the souls of men and of orangutans had their particular places within the chain of being. Thus far Herder was a protagonist of what Krauss characterized as the emancipatory current, but at the same time he insisted upon the indivisibility of the soul and pointed out that reason, memory, imagination, and passions were the various expressions of the indivisible soul.'4 This account had important consequences for the discussion of the soul and the brain. While Herder regarded it as useful to examine the size of the brain in different species, he also demanded a physiological examination of the more "beautiful organization and proportion [of the brain], which enabled it to receive the mental sentiments and ideas".15 One might be inclined to assume that Herder was a Cartesian dualist. Not at all. Herder wanted to have it both ways, that is, to explain some aspects of human nature on the basis of brain research and to hold the metaphysical view of man's indivisible soul at the same time. Herder himself seemed to have no difficulties in harmonizing these two approaches. For his successors this was an enormous stimulus, but it also evoked tricky difficulties. This is clear from the different approaches of Soemmerring and Gall, who both referred to Herder in their own ways. Gall simply took the idea of the morphological development of the brain and related it to mental talents and properties by separating the mind from the soul-body problem, which for him was beyond an empirical approach. Soemmerring, however, tried to fulfil Herder's ambiguous claim by explaining the presence of the soul in the brain on the basis of new anatomical and physiological insights. Soemmerring was therefore attacked for his metaphysical claims, and he was refuted for using the wrong method in this issue, while Gall was criticized for having excluded metaphysics. This position was formulated by two anatomists and physiologists, who were the main protagonists of romantische Naturphilosophie: Karl Friedrich Burdach (1776-1847) and Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869). 16 It would be too simple to propose their basic opposition to Rudolphi and Meckel on the one hand and to Soemmerring and Gall on the other. There were important differences in Burdach's and Carus's approaches. This suggests that they represented different interests despite their common philosophical attitude.
SOEMMERRING AND GALL
Although Soemmerring was aware that the question of localizing the site of interaction between soul and body was an old problem, he was convinced that he had found a completely new solution. The novel element was that he did not search for the organ of the soul in the solid matter of the brain, but in the fluid of the cerebral ventricles. To support his hypothesis he developed a theory of the function of the organ of the soul, by which he attempted to explain the process of nerve-signal transmission in the cerebrospinal fluid and the interaction between the fluid and the cranial nerves. Therefore, Soemmerring divided his argument into two: an anatomical part and a theoretical, his "transcendental physiology".
Soemmerring's basic anatomical assumption followed Descartes' claim that the meeting site of the afferent and efferent nerve signals was the place of interaction between body and soul. The next problem for Soemmerring was to identify the origins of all cranial nerves in the walls of the ventricles. Before this, however, he had to deal with anatomical questions: whether the ventricles were in fact cavities and whether they were filled with fluid. These problems had been widely discussed in the late eighteenth century. Albrecht von Haller only to prevent the walls sticking together. 19 Soemrnerring therefore suggested that a "correct" anatomical statement (that is, one not comparing the cerebral ventricles with other cavities of the body, because of their different shape and structure) leads to a "correct" physiological conclusion (that is, the fluid had a function in addition to keeping the ventricles expanded). A remarkable aspect of Soemmerring's logic is that five years earlier he had been convinced about the anatomical facts, but drew no conclusion concerning the function of the cerebrospinal fluid.20 This suggests that his interpretation of its function was not the result of anatomical evidence, but the product of his ideas about the organ of the soul.
Soemmerring also followed this strategy in his analysis of the topographical anatomy of the cranial nerves. His discussion of their origins in the brain shows that he could find them in the walls of the ventricles in only a few cases, whereas in others he could find no connections between the nerves and the ventricles. Therefore he pointed out the difficulties of dissecting, which did not allow him to find what he was looking for.2' Nevertheless he was convinced that all cranial nerves had a direct connection with the cerebrospinal fluid. For the moment he was satisfied to have found four cranial nerves to support his hypothesis.22 One of these was the olfactory nerve, for he could show a direct connection between the olfactory bulb and the lateral ventricles in mammals and in human embryos, but not in human adults. He explained this difference in the following way:
Does not natural history teach us that some animals are far more directed by the olfactory sense than humans? The reason is that in these animals the large cavity of the olfactory nerve accepts a large amount of the cerebrospinal fluid, and thus represents a large part of their sensorium.23
This conclusion led Soemmerring to his main anatomical argument, namely the correlation between material quantity and function. He stressed this point on several occasions, arguing that the size of the ventricles and the quantity of the fluid were the material basis for the innate differences in the development of mental talents. the claim to demonstrate man's singularity without reconsidering Descartes' immaterial soul. Man's singularity, however, also implicated the European's superiority over the non-European for Soemmerring. This will be discussed below; but first of all the second part of Soemmerring's argument has to be analysed.
This second, and theoretical, argument concerned the interaction between the cerebrospinal fluid and the cranial nerves. The main problem was to explain the transmission of the nerve signals in fluid, and he found the solution by proposing an animation and organization for it. As this was beyond empirical evidence he introduced the dimension of "transcendental physiology",27 which he tried to establish alongside his anatomical approach. The animation of matter and the organization of living bodies was widely discussed at that time, and, in particular, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) had laid the ground for what was defined as "vital materialism".28 Linked to Blumenbach's principle of the Bildungstrieb (formative drive), Kant had argued that one could understand the function of the individual parts of the organized body only in relation to the whole body. Therefore, the union of these parts into a whole could only happen through mutual causation, which was going beyond the domain of mechanistic thinking. At this point Kant introduced teleology, the idea that the interaction of separate parts could only be interpreted as a purposeful process.29 The problem in our context is that Soemmerring used terms like animation and organization of the body without giving credit to the theoretical background. His argument was that animation of the cerebrospinal fluid was a necessary condition for the phenomenon of life, because "the beginning of life (Urleben) or the beginning of a movement is not even thinkable in a being which is constant and unchangeable in its form".30 He employed this postulate to explain the interaction between the common sensorium and the ventricular fluid, and argued that the former needed the latter for its function because of its special character. Thus Soemmerring concluded that the physiological process within the organ of the soul should also have a singular character, different from the physiological processes in the brain and nerves. It was necessary, then, to propose a qualitative change of the signal on its way from the cranial nerve to the organ of the soul, and vice versa. Therefore, the ventricular fluid was the "medium uniens"..31 One might be inclined to link Soemmerring's notion of the ventricular fluid to the older concept of "animal spirits" secreted in the brain and conveyed by the nerves, but this would obscure his aims. Animal spirits had served for the transmission of sensations to the organ of the soul and to transmit messages from the latter to the different parts of the body. Soemmerring acceptance of his philosophical approach. His proud and grateful announcement of the epilogue, however, stands in peculiar contrast to Kant's text.
Kant suspected that Soemmerring had not differentiated sharply between the "seat of the soul" and the "seat of the organ of the soul", and asked who was competent to deal with this fundamental question. He noted a "battle of the [academic] faculties", between the medical (anatomical and physiological) on the one hand, and the philosophical on the other.38 The former, he continued, based its results on empirical reasoning, the latter demanded a priori explanations. Kant pointed out that a person taking the philosophical view in characterizing the mind or the soul could not possibly accept the anatomical and physiological concept of the seat of the soul, and vice versa. His epistemological argument was that the soul is exclusively "the object of the inner sense, and hence only determinable from temporal conditions".39 Searching for a topographical site for the soul would imply perceiving it by the same sense, that perceived the outer world.
The soul can only perceive itself through the inner sense; the body, however, can only be perceived (internally or externally) through the external senses. Hence the soul can not determine a location for itself, because in order to be able to do so it would have to make itself an object of its external Anschauung and to make itself external to itself, which is self-contradictory. 40 Kant suggested a strict division of the problem: the soul itself was subject only to philosophical analysis, while physiology had the task of examining the function of the brain, or of the common sensorium, which was that part of the brain responsible for the unification of sensory perceptions. This meant, on the other hand, that Kant in principle rejected a science dealing with the soul and body at the same time.
In his second argument, Kant discussed Soemmerring's grounds for postulating the animation and organization of the cerebrospinal fluid. He refused to define a fluid as being organized, because a fluid has the property of being "vital materialism". He tried to solve this dilemma by proposing a dynamic organization of the ventricular fluid. Thus the process of signal transmission in the fluid was not mechanical-as Soemmerring had assumed-but chemical.42 With this modification Kant brought Soemmerring's hypothesis into agreement with his own definition of the organization of matter, although his attempt was not accepted by contemporary physiologists. This was because "vital materialism" was an important factor in the development of embryology and in physiology, but not in brain research, as will be seen below.
In the same context Kant also rejected "transcendental physiology". According to him, the transcendental method serves to uncover the constitutive elements of any experience. This process, however, is necessarily metaphysical, or, in Kant's words, "43 Transzendentalphilosophie is "the system of all principles of pure reason".
Consequently, a physiological theory-despite its speculative character-cannot possibly be part of the transcendental method. Instead he argued that the notion of animation and organization was part of a scientific concept. As in his earlier corrective, Kant insisted on a strict separation of the scientific and the metaphysical approaches.44
Kant's criticism was highly relevant for further discussion. Even if his position was not accepted, his precise analysis of Soemmerring's physiology and his epistemological argumentation of separating the soul and the organ of the soul created the framework for subsequent discussion. It is questionable whether Kant could have anticipated the consequences of his considerations. After all, he had not challenged the legitimacy of the concept of the organ of the soul. But he wanted to restrict it to the material site of the unification of perceptions and thus make it the subject of physiological research. With Kant's rejection of any philosophical relevance of the search for the organ of the soul by means of anatomy and physiology, the demise of this concept was in sight, and it survived only briefly, until it was replaced by two completely different concepts. The complete failure of Soemmerring's claim had consequences for the subsequent development of anatomy and physiology: either they avoided radically any philosophical viewpoint and competence; or they claimed to be philosophical in themselves. Both positions were upheld in early nineteenth-century Germany.
Franz Joseph Gall's fame began to spread long before he published an extensive study on his subject in 1810, in part with Johann Caspar Spurzheim (1776-1832). From 1800 onwards anatomists began to visit Gall in Vienna, and enthusiastic reports were published by his followers. anatomist, or even an intellectual, who was not familiar with Gall's basic assumptions.45
The analysis of Gall and his adversaries has focused mainly on his rejection by the Academy of Sciences in Paris under the leadership of Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) and its direct consequence, Pierre Flourens' experimental "refutation". Several historians have argued plausibly that the metaphysical basis for this attack lay in Cartesian dualism, by which the indivisibility of the soul was upheld.46 Flourens refused to accept the existence within the brain of several small brains representing different talents and propensities of the soul. His experiments led him to the conclusion that sensation, volition, and so forth were not localized in different parts of the cerebral cortex. For Flourens, this was direct proof for the unity of the self. The significant feature of Flourens' disputation is that he construed a link between a philosophical assumption and experimentation. According to him, brain localization was incompatible with the independent soul and free will, whereas equipotentiality harmonized perfectly with it. This conclusion could be possible only if anatomy or physiology were able directly or indirectly to support the Cartesian concept of the indivisible and independent soul.47
Even if Flourens was the most illustrious, he was neither the only nor the first of Gall's critics. Between 1802 and 1808, there were more than fifty publications on his doctrine, many in agreement, but many more or less critical.48 As Gall at that time had not yet published his first systematic work, the criticism was based mainly upon his lectures, his anatomical demonstrations on his tour through Germany, and the short schematic paper of 1798,49 in which he developed his research programme, and which was not superseded until the publication of his last work in 1825. Although Gall's theory has been studied intensively by various historians,50 I should like to point out some crucial arguments in the 1798 paper.
Gall's first postulate was that mental talents and propensities are innate and that they have their seat and cause in the brain. The nobility and the complexity of these functions increase in proportion to the increasing size of the brain relative to the mass of the body and in particular to the nerves.51 Gall's second point was that abilities are different from propensities, and that both are divided into several sub-groups. Thus, 45 Cf. Erich Ebstein, ' he maintained, they had their seats in different and independent parts of the brain. If this conclusion was correct, Gall argued, different forms of the brain evolved in different species; and the same was also true for individuals within one species.52 Because of the variable development of the individual organs in the brain in different individuals, their behaviour became comprehensible. Gall's last and most popular postulate was that the inner surface of the cranium is determined by the outer surface of the brain. Consequently talents and propensities could be deduced from the outer surface of the skull, if this was equivalent to the inner one. Gall's aim was to trace a causal link between the structure of the brain, its function, and human behaviour. In his paper of 1798 Gall emphasized neither the structure nor the function of the brain, but rather he postulated that function was the linking element between structure and behaviour. In 1809 he pointed out that it was natural "to consider structure and function together and to treat them as a single and identical doctrine".53
Gall derived his research strategy from the empirical tradition of the first Vienna School.54 As a disciple of Maximilian Stoll (1742-1787), who had upheld the doctrines and methods of Boerhaave and van Swieten, Gall rejected pure reasoning and insisted upon observation. This leads to the problem of Gall's methodological approach to discovering the seats of the different organs. In this connection Gall referred mainly to anatomical and pathological observations of the brain as well as to the examination of skulls. He demanded a study of the correlation of brain lesions and clinical symptoms. Furthermore, he suggested that one should examine the specific parts of the brain by referring to the known talents and propensities of the individual, and to undertake studies in comparative anatomy.55 None of these demands was unusual around 1800, but the point is that Gall put his hypotheses into an anatomical framework from the beginning. His strategy was not primarily anatomical, but he needed anatomy to help answer his questions. Consequently Gall was greatly interested in persuading anatomists; Rudolphi, reporting on his meeting with him in Vienna, stated that he wished to be criticized by means of anatomical arguments. Another aspect of Gall's anatomical approach leads to the question of its relationship to Naturphilosophie in Germany. Gall was perfectly aware of the provocative character of his doctrine. As early as 1798 he anticipated reproach for challenging the immortality of the soul, rejecting it with the remark that he was only interested in the "laws of the material world. ... He [the natural scientist] cannot decide about the life of the mind. He only observes, and teaches that in this life the mind is linked to the body".57 It was obvious to Gall that the assumption of several independent talents and propensities did not at all deny the eternity and the indivisibility of the soul.58 Later on, he stated more explicitly that the soul was not the object of science:
I even omit the question of the soul, although we have to think about a principle of its actions (Prinzip der Tatigkeit). As anatomists and physiologists, however, we are unable to say anything about it.59
Here, Gall seems to agree with Kant's separation of the philosophical and the physiological method. But, on the other hand, Gall did not point out clearly what he understood by a philosophical problem relevant to the knowledge of human nature. This is not surprising: for him, such a problem did not exist. In the preface to his last publication, Sur les fonctions du cerveau et sur celles de chacune de ses parties (1821-25), he made the ambition of his project quite clear.
The aim of all my investigations is to establish a doctrine of the functions of the brain. This doctrine must lead to a complete understanding of human nature.60
If this was Gall's aim, his admission that he had not investigated the human soul becomes meaningless. He discarded metaphysical problems of the soul as irrelevant and thus proclaimed an absoluteness, which brought him into conflict with the philosophical and theological approach-a reminder of Kant's diagnosis of a battle of the faculties. In contrast to the discussion in France, which was based on the Cartesian tradition, the debate in Germany was more complex. Gall was confronted by two groups with different interests, although each focused on his anatomy and physiology of human nature. Gall was regarded in part as a pseudo-scientist or charlatan, but he was mainly criticized by established scientists because of his radicalism in terms of the accepted confines of anatomy and philosophy.
Soemmerring agreed in their claims to explain human nature, namely the differences between men and animals, and the variations of men one from another. On this point Gall's theory was more diversified because he introduced the categories of talents and propensities. Soemmerring sustained the philosophical importance of localization, while Gall ignored this claim. But much more importantly, both agreed with the anatomical method, and both pointed out explicitly the correlation between material size and the development of the psyche. Quantity was essential for both of them, and anatomy was their central method.
RUDOLPHI AND MECKEL
We have seen that Kant distinguished between a philosophical approach on the one hand and an anatomical one on the other. It has also been shown that Soemmerring and Gall gave concrete answers to the question of the soul and the brain. In Rudolphi and Meckel we have two anatomists who were much more reserved concerning these problems. Although they did not regard anatomy as unable in principle to deal with brain localization, they judged it incompetent at that time. At the same time, they did not relate their anatomical approach to Haller's concept of equipotentiality of brain function. It was.not the case that around 1800 there was a debate between believers in Haller's concept and Gall's localization theory: the discussion had shifted to a philosophical and methodological level at which Soemmerring and Gall were cited, but not Haller. Consequently Haller played no role in Rudolphi's and Meckel's arguments. Nevertheless, their concepts were in no way identical, Rudolphi was much more involved in the controversy, and his contribution had a more constructive character.
Central to Rudolphi's criticism of Soemmerring was his conception of the use of hypotheses in science. Haller's pragmatic argument had been that hypotheses are useful in so far as they might lead to theoretical questions that could be answered by observation or experiment. Consequently, hypotheses were necessary in order to pose questions and were an important element of empirical science.61 Rudolphi, however, accepted hypotheses only in those cases where he failed to make any useful observation. His warning against uncritically mingling hypothesis and empiricism was primarily directed against the new concepts of Naturphilosophie and in particular the attempts to understand the relationship of the soul and the brain. According to Rudolphi Rudolphi seems to have been the only anatomist who compared Soemmerring's observations of the cranial nerves with his own. He analysed each cranial nerve and did not in principle reject Soemmerring's findings, but he gave them a different interpretation. According to Rudolphi, the fact that not all the cranial nerves could be found in the walls of the ventricles detracted from Soemmerring's original hypothesis.66 In the case of the olfactory nerve, for example, he rejected Soemmerring's postulate of a direct correlation between the size of the olfactory bulb and the sense of smell: if Soemmerring had found this anatomical structure only in human embryos, this was meaningless for function, because the function of smell in embryos was unknown.67 Rudolphi's argument was thus based on, first, a denial of the connection between structure and function, because there was as yet insufficient experimental knowledge; and second, a rejection of the optimistic "soon-to-be" strategy. He interpreted Soemmerring's and his own anatomical observations in a way which testified against a localization of the organ of the soul.
Rudolphi, of course, did not reduce the problem to the anatomy of the cranial nerves. In his discussion of Soemmerring's "transcendental physiology", he amply pointed out his scepticism. Thus he accepted the animation and organization of matter only as heuristic epithets for unknown bodily processes. For him, an acceptable definition of animation was the observable activity of those parts of the body which were able to cause an effect on themselves or on other parts of the body. But this applied to solid matter such as nerves, muscles or internal organs, and not to fluids.68 This concept seems to come close to Kant's definition of organization, but the striking difference is that Rudolphi ignored the idea of purpose, becauseaccording to him-it was an hypothesis without an empirical basis. The conclusion which Rudolphi had to draw was clear: while Kant and Blumenbach had sought a theoretical concept to explain the phenomenon of life, Rudolphi merely admitted his ignorance.
The consequence for brain function and the organ of the soul was that Rudolphi separated these two problems. He did not regard the function of the brain as undetectable in principle. However, he maintained that the contemporary methodology was insufficient, because it lacked an adequate anatomical and physiological basis. For example, he agreed with the common theoretical definition of the organ of the soul as that place in which all efferent and afferent nerves met, and whose destruction would evoke a complete loss of sensory and motor function. As no one had found such a circumscribed part of the brain, he suggested that the whole 6But the influence also existed in Germany. changing during one's lifetime. Rudolphi further pointed out that our impression of human character is not necessarily identical with the character itself, because our judgement always depends on our own interests, sympathies, and antipathies.7' He did not therefore reject the localization of brain function in general, but merely pointed out that it is a contradiction to establish a direct link between dynamic behaviour and a static localization in the brain, particularly since the underlying assumption-our daily experience-is anything but reliable.72 But even if it were possible to define a particular talent, this signified nothing about its representation in the brain. Provocatively, Rudolphi demanded a comparison of such a talent with a localized part of the brain in more than one case. Only then would it be legitimate to propose a correlation. It was clear to him that no one had ever been able to provide this, and therefore: "The brain has taught us nothing".73
In Gall's theory, the innate character of mental talents and propensities was linked to the increase in size of the separate organs in the brain. Rudolphi argued that the power of an organ depended not only on its size or weight, but also on its inner energy, which was independent from these.74 In this way, the rejection of a compatibility between structure and function meant a separation between physiology and anatomy; and the size and weight of the brain were not linked to behaviour.75 In this context the brain's own physiological processes were used against Gall, although Rudolphi had earlier argued against Soemmerring that the nature of brain activity was unknown. Against both Soemmerring and Gall, Rudolphi vehemently criticized the postulation of a link between the size of the brain and human talents. It is therefore unlikely that Rudolphi's scepticism was based on purely methodological reasons alone. Another motive becomes more obvious in his attempt to make relative the innate character of mental abilities. Although he did not definitely exclude factors such as the form and energy of the brain, the ability to learn was much more important to him. The development of mental talents, he noted, mainly depended on the education of the child; and if some talents were more developed than others, this was because of the quality of education, not the innate size of any organs in the brain.76 Herewith Rudolphi brought a new dimension into the discussion. If it was Gall's aim to explain all of human nature with his system, Rudolphi suggested that this problem be discussed on a different level.
In it also shows his enthusiasm for the positive influence of education.78 Most fascinating for Rudolphi was that Pestalozzi's system was concerned not only with the intellectual aspect of learning, but also with the moral development and the training of the child's practical abilities: only the harmony of all three aspects guaranteed the Bildung des Menschlichen. He continued: He [Pestalozzi] brings up boys to be human beings-the baron, future scholar or artist are not educated here; rather it is the human being who is educated. The potentialities (Anlagen) of man are developed in a general way; his strengths are drawn out from himself.79 This is an exact depiction of Pestalozzi's approach, which recognized that the task of teaching was to develop man's mind, body and heart. 80 It would be too simple to argue that Rudolphi rejected Gall because he believed in man's development into an autonomous person, an active participant in an enlightened society.81 Of course, it is no coincidence that Rudolphi came to regard Gall's doctrine as a modification of Johann Caspar Lavater's (1741-1801) physiognomy,82 the only difference being that Gall characterized man on the basis of cranial bumps, not facial expressions. Rudolphi agreed with Georg Christoph Lichtenberg83 that man's character was to be described only on the basis of behaviour.84 But Gall had not denied the influence of education. Confronted with the existence of a significant bump without the correlating talent, and vice versa, Gall conceded that natural potentialities could be suppressed during a given lifetime and, conversely, that any ability could result from good education without innate talent. In this modification, however, Rudolphi saw the devaluation of the entire theory:
If there are more or less developed parts or organs of the brain which are responsible for our personalities, our likes or dislikes, and our intellectual powers, then I cannot imagine that a given talent would be completely silent if its corresponding great material potentiality (groJie An/age) were present. 85 Rudolphi concluded that a grofie Anlage did not exist in such a specific way and that it was not represented in any part of the brain. He did not accuse Gall of being an Schaller, Padagogik: eine Geschichte der Bildung und Erziehung, 3 vols, Freiburg and Munich, Karl Alber, anti-Enlightenment fatalist, but he saw the danger of fatalistic consequences if everything in human nature were reduced to brain weight and to the specific form of some of its parts. Gall was persuaded that the effect of education was solely based on the knowledge of the organization of the brain;86 Rudolphi, on the contrary, thought that education was based on the belief in a self-aware and independent personality.87
In comparison with Rudolphi, the question of the organ of the soul and the localization of brain function is by no means as central to the work of Meckel. Its importance, however, lies in the definition of the role of anatomy. Although Meckel did not consider methodological questions, he agreed with Rudolphi his Handbuch der menschlichen Anatomie (1815-20),94 only localization plays a rather significant role.
Concerning the organ of the soul, Meckel rejected Soemmerring's concept of the ventricles. He gave only a topographical account of the ventricles without any hint of the fluid's special character or function.95 Still more importantly, Meckel challenged the idea that the organ of the soul must be identical with the meeting-place of afferent and efferent nerves. Rudolphi had doubted the existence of such a common site, but Meckel had no firm opinion. On the one hand he left undecided with which substance the central ends of the cranial nerves were connected, and whether or not they were connected among themselves.96 At the same time, he pointed out that some sensory and motor nerves not only had a common origin, their function was in part mixed, that is, they had both motor and sensory functions.97 On this basis Meckel regarded them as a unity, and he argued against Gall's opinion that systems for voluntary movement and sensory perception were represented in different parts of the brain. This leads to Meckel's judgement of Gall's localization theory. First of all he regarded Gall as a serious brain anatomist and often cited him in an approving way along with Alexander Monro secundus (1733-1817), Soemmerring, and Reil in his chapters on the nervous system. But Meckel was completely silent concerning Gall's organology, with the exception of the question of localization. Meckel's strategy in the face of difficult hypotheses was to cite arguments for and against them; the localization of mental functions was such an enigma. According to him, the problem of whether the whole brain or only circumscribed parts are the "seat of the origin (Urquell) of mental and bodily life"98 could be decided only by observation and experiment. Hence he summed up the arguments for brain equipotentiality:
1. Even an extensive lesion of the brain does not necessarily lead to mental defects. 2. A lesion in one particular part of the brain does not necessarily lead to the loss of the same mental function in different individuals.
3. An increase in mental power is not necessarily correlated with an increase in the brain's size and weight.99 On the other hand, Meckel referred to the arguments for localization: 1. The complexity of mental activities seems to be related to the compound structure of the brain.
2. The greater development of particular mental propensities seems to parallel the development of particular parts of the brain.100
In discussing these contradictory opinions, Meckel refuted the first two arguments for equipotentiality. First, he noted, lesions of the same part of the brain were never identical in different individuals; and second, the brain's symmetrical doubleness 94 same must be true of his impact upon brain research during the Romantic period. His assumptions that were most influential in medical and physiological thinking, were (1) the philosophy of identity or totality, (2) the principle of polarity, and (3) the concept of advancement in nature.106 In particular, the idea of identity between microcosm and macrocosm, between mind and nature, brought a new element to the discussion. Schelling's equation, "nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the indivisible Nature",107 had a significance for brain research beyond that of Burdach and Carcus.'08 Schelling made it quite plain that the problem of soul and body was outside the domain of empirical anatomy and physiology. He argued against the dualistic theories, which shifted the problem from one part of the brain to the other without providing any valuable solution:
But sometime, somewhere, a point must surely come where mind and matter are one, or where the great leap we have so long sought to avoid becomes inevitable; and in this all theories are alike.
Whether I allow animal spirits, electrical fluids, or types of gas to suffuse or fill the nerves, and thereby to propagate impressions from outside into the sensorium, or whether I pursue the soul into the uttermost (and still more problematical) humours of the brain (a project which at least has the merit of having done the uttermost) is, with respect to the matter in hand, altogether indifferent. It is clear that our critique has come full circle, but not that we have become in any degree wiser than we were to begin with, about that antithesis from which we started. We leave behind man, as evidently the most devious problem of all philosophy, and our critique ends here in the same extremity with which it began.'09
Schelling's criticism of the attempts from Descartes to Soemmerring stressed that the missing link between brain and mind could not be found within the categories of causality. Instead he construed a unification of causation and teleology, by which nature was regarded as "a circle which returns into itself, a self-enclosed system".' 10 Schelling applied his theory to brain research only in an aphoristic way and only in a few places. The rejection of the organ of the soul had an anti-dualist impetus, which ended in Schelling's demand that physiologists restrict their research to the investigation of animal functions. Concerning the relation of soul and body he noted: "It is not their problem how these completely opposed viewpoints will finally be united in one common entity".' 1 1 What he meant was: carry on with your empirical investigations of the brain, we-the philosophers-will manage the interpretation of your results. This statement was certainly not a repetition or modification of Kant's position, because for Kant it was in no way the business of philosophy to interpret the results of empirical research. On the contrary, we must interpret the naturphilosophisch approach to brain theory as a challenge to Kant's epistemological separation of the soul and the brain. 112 When Schelling wrote this, he could not know that only a few years later anatomists and physiologists would try to develop the synthesis he had demanded. In his autobiography, Karl Friedrich Burdach described his visit to Franz Joseph Gall in Paris in 1826. Gall was extremely surprised:
He [Gall] asked me, whether I came from Konigsberg and whether I was the author of the book about the brain [Vom Baue und Leben des Gehirns], and then he exclaimed: "You are visiting me?". Admittedly I had said of him in this book, whilst recognizing his other merits, that by trying to discover the basis of [psychological] phenomena he had entered an area unfamiliar to him, where his crude materialism had created an extremely daring theory."'3
Gall then went to his work table and fetched Burdach's book, saying that Burdach had erroneously been convinced by Flourens' experiments (of 1824) and that he, Gall, had refuted all of them. He added that Transzendentalphilosophie was nonsense. According to this anecdote, Gall was convinced that Burdach's attack was based on the results of Flourens' experiments and upon the theory of Transzendentalphilosophie. Burdach did not reject this view in the cited passage, but Gall was wrong in both assumptions.114 Burdach was no follower of Flourens, and 1 l l Idem, Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der hoheren Physik Zur Erkiarung des allgemeinen Organismus, perhaps Gall was not aware that Burdach had already rejected his organology as early as 1810 in his book Die Physiologie. " I As noted, Gall knew Burdach's renowned Vom Baue und Leben des Gehirns,"16 in which he described the anatomy and physiology of the brain on the basis of his own experiments and dissections. His theory about the presence of the soul in the brain was based mainly on the fundamentals of Naturphilosophie, and this becomes clear after comparing the 1819-26 book with that of 1810, which includes no empirical studies. Both versions agree in their philosophical claims, but differ in their application to brain physiology.
In Die Physiologie Burdach described fully his version of naturphilosophisch methodology. He distinguished between Naturkunde, which only described natural phenomena, and Naturwissenschaft, which was the philosophical knowledge of nature. Only in this way, he argued, is it possible to explain the phenomena of nature, its laws and causal connections. Physiology, then, was the doctrine of human life, inasmuch as "the organic interlocking of the original appearances of a thing constitutes life within it". 1 17 According to Burdach, two different methods or sources for physiology can be distinguished:
1. The empirical principle is the doctrine of organic functions. It consists of four elements: observation, experimentation, the comparison between the healthy and the diseased organism, and hypotheses. The most problematic element is experimentation, because the results of the experimenters' manipulation are often difficult to distinguish from unexpected and unintentional changes occurring in the animal. Thus, experiments must be repeated under the same conditions. Moreover, hypotheses should be based "on observation, experiments and analogy. They should be simple and not applied too closely, they should make few assumptions, and should explain a lot by the use of their postulates. Furthermore they should not contradict an accepted law of nature". 118 Thus far Burdach accepted the empirical principle, and he characterized it as the only basis of physiology in former times, and as a necessary, but insufficient basis for contemporary physiology.
2. The rational or scientific principle explains the connection between, the reason for, and the purpose of phenomena. Burdach assumed three ways of explaining these. The first was to account for them on their own. Referring to the concept of a life force and to Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb, Burdach criticized the fact that neither explained the function of the organism, but only assumed an unknown force. "19 The second way was the use of analogy, which compares one group of natural phenomena with others, either from organic or inorganic nature. Here Burdach enumerated nearly all the theories around 1800 thought to explain the phenomena of life, and his criticism of them all was that there was a particular phenomenon that was not considered or even contradicted the theory. If some missing link could truly explain those phenomena, he theory of the a priori conditions of science that is, of course, different from Schelling's concept. On this difference see the articles by Gregory, op. cit., note 1 2 above.
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argued, then the cause of life had to be sought in an absolute principle. 120 His analysis of the different modifications of materialistic and vitalistic theories attempted to show that these were useful, but could, after all, be applied only to physiological processes and functions, but not to the nature of these processes and functions. Burdach therefore proposed a third way, which explained life on the basis of the totality of nature. This was a legitimate consequence of Schelling's philosophy, because the laws for nature and mind were identical. This law-or "higher sphere" in Burdach's terminology-can be discerned in the following way: "The organization of all of nature is revealed to us by merely using reason (reine Vernunftanschauung), which is the true source of Naturwissenschaft". 121 Burdach did not isolate Vernunftanschauung from the other two methods, but rather regarded it as the perfection of Naturwissenschaft. According to Burdach, science was organized like the organism itself, i.e., it was concerned with the idea of advancement. In this concept, observation and experiment played a role equal to that of the explanation of phenomena on their own or by analogy, but he accepted these methods only in reference to Vernunftanschauung, the noblest element in his model. With the construction of this model Burdach met Schelling's provocative challenge perfectly. The remarkable element in Burdach's approach is that he used it not only to explain the phenomena of life, but also to elucidate the scientific method and its historical development.
The question now is, how did Burdach apply his theory to brain research? However, his is less a synthesis of mind and matter than one of Soemmerring's and Gall's doctrines on the basis of the tenets of Naturphilosophie. Burdach defined the organ of the soul as the place where the psyche interacts with the brain.'22 The gas or vapour in the cerebral ventricles, accordingly, could unify all parts of the brain, but Burdach was in no way interested in animation and organization of the ventricular fluid. With this close approximation to the dualistic view he seemed to challenge Schelling's attempt to supersede dualism. Burdach's manoeuvre to avoid conflict with Schelling was to create a polarity between the soul and the brain; in other words, the soul and the brain were merely the antagonistic aspects of one absolute principle. Burdach egoism" (korperlicher Egoismus) and felt "a part of the universe and hence embraces the whole universe with love".'25 The idea of the absolute, of eternity, was restricted to man. Consequently, this is "visible in the bump on the top of the skull, and this exists only in man".126
In this way Burdach, guided by Naturphilosophie, combined elements of Soemmerring's and Gall's theories. Organology allowed him to prove the singularity of man. Burdach's criticism of Gall was not intended as a rejection of brain localization, but Gall had sinned against the naturphilosophisch tenet of combining the empirical and the rational method. Burdach argued that man's ability to recognize the absolute harmony between himself and the universe did not play the slightest role in Gall's doctrine, and this had led him to materialism. For Burdach, however, that harmony was an essential fact. It was a central aim of Naturphilosophie to supersede materialism and dualism, and Burdach fully agreed with this. In practice, however, the interpretative range of this message was wide enough to combine heterogeneous aspects. Thus Burdach was able to sustain Soemmerring's concept by stressing exhaustively the concept of polarity. The question is not so much whether his attempt was plausible or not, but rather why he made it. I propose that in 1810 Burdach had no other choice. It is obvious that Gall's organology or Rudolphi's scepticism were not reasonable alternatives for him; and equipotentiality ran counter to the hierarchy of the brain, which was so important for Burdach as a manifestation of the difference between man and animal. The concept of the organ of the soul was the final alternative, and it seemed to be a compromise for Burdach, because Soemmerring's model was not obviously dualistic.
The application of the principles of Naturphilosophie to brain research thus took place on different levels, and this led to different results. The main and constant factor was the identity between nature and soul and, as a consequence, the idea of an absolute principle. All other factors were variable. This becomes clear when Burdach's major revision of his theory in his three-volume treatise on the brain (1819-26) is considered.
In 1813 Burdach had accepted a call from the University of Kbnigsberg to occupy the chair of anatomy and physiology. This gave him the opportunity to continue the systematic anatomical studies of the brain that he had begun in Dorpat (Tartu) in 1811.
In the second volume of Vom Baue und Leben des Gehirns (1822) Burdach included an extensive review of the entire history of brain research up to the early nineteenth century.'27 He regarded Gall as highly innovative, but restricted his praise to the anatomical studies: "But Gall stepped out of his sphere of expertise by trying to discover the cause of the [mental] phenomena (Grund der Erscheinungen)". 128 Burdach anatomy to legitimize his doctrine. Rather, he blamed Gall for failing to offer empirical proof for his theory, and pointed out that he had not found what he was searching for, namely a bridge between his theory and his anatomical findings; for he could not prove that any of his so-called brain organs (with exception of the organ of the reproductive instinct, which is supposed to be the cerebellum) stands in relation exclusively with one specific part of the brain. '29 This might equally well have been written by Rudolphi. Burdach also noted the incompatibility between structure and function despite Gall's and Soemmerring's attempts to reconcile them. But while Rudolphi was led to a sceptical admission of ignorance on this question, Burdach based his opinion on the basic tenet of Naturphilosophie.
In contrast to his earlier approach, Burdach then began a harsh attack on the dualistic view. He blamed Descartes for founding dualism and noted that this mechanistic explanation for the interaction between soul and body was a product of imagination, not empiricism.130 Soemmerring's anatomy was identified as the "beginning of a new era" in brain research.'3' Burdach enumerated Soemmerring's anatomical discoveries and casually mentioned his doctrine of the ventricular organ of the soul without commenting on the fact that he had welcomed it only a few years before.
On the grounds of this rejection, Burdach developed a new definition of the relation between soul and brain. The soul was "a dynamic phenomenon (dynamische Erscheinung), an inner activity of life (innere Lebenstdtigkeit), which had neither material form nor external movement nor spatial activity (rdumliche Wirksamkeit)".132 The brain, however, had all the properties the soul lacked. From this Burdach concluded that the entire brain is the organ of the soul, and proposed an equilibrium between the two: the soul was the highest expression of the "dynamic principle" in nature just as the brain was the highest expression of the "material principle". Finally Burdach linked these principles to the dimensions of space and time: "The brain contains the same characteristics in space as the soul does in time. The brain is thus the physical image of the soul, the material condition of its appearance within finitude". If the activity of the soul (Seelentatigkeit) is transmitted by the brain as a whole, then each individual brain structure must make its own individual contribution to it or participate in a significant way to the process as a whole.'36
With this statement Burdach reached a synthesis that combined the pantheistic view of the absolute and the demand for the unity of the self with the localization of brain function. Its remarkable feature is that Burdach incorporated elements of dualism and of Gall's doctrine without involving their potential difficulties. This was only possible with naturphilosophisch presuppositions. Burdach had attempted the same course in his earlier proposition, but the result was quite different. The concepts of polarity and of the different hierarchical spheres of the brain, in particular, no longer played an important role. Of course, the superiority of ideas over physical existence was the real origin of life for Burdach, 137 and human reason was the highest expression of natural action. 138 His primary aim was no longer to find arguments for the superiority of the soul over matter and of man over animal. Instead he claimed that Naturwissenschaft would be identical with natural theology, if natural phenomena were regarded within the context of nature as a whole.'39
What is the reason for the difference between Burdach's two propositions? Burdach conducted anatomical research at Konigsberg, but it would be too simple to argue that observation and dissection evoked a shift in the application of Naturphilosophie to brain theory. It would, for example, not have been necessary for him personally to examine the brain to discover that not all cranial nerves originate in the ventricular walls: this had already been noted by Rudolphi, Gall, and Meckel. Rather it was Burdach's aim to revise some aspects of the relationship between Naturphilosophie and brain research, and he borrowed some ideas from Carus Basic to Carus's theory was the distinction between the somatic and the dynamic aspect of the nervous system, both of which he reduced to one unifying principle. Accordingly, the soul, although the highest and most noble manifestation of the nervous system, was not basically different from other phenomena of life. 143 The next step would be the examination of the brain in sequence from the lowest forms to its highest expression, namely the human soul. Carus attacked his predecessors in brain research for their faulty method; that is, they began with a search for the soul. This approach, Carus argued, could only lead to the concept of the organ of the soul, whose earlier acceptance had been directed by an "incorrect understanding of ideals about the freedom of the soul, immortality, and so forth". 144 Carus, far from denying the moral value of these ideals, rejected the view that they would be contradicted by the assumption of a more direct relationship between soul and brain. Because of the assumed identity of the soul and the brain Carus saw no reason to put brain research into the framework of moral questions, which would lead to the fatal mistake of trying to find the organ of the soul. His alternative suggestion was based on the well-known ideas of identity and of polarity. He thought that the conflict between different powers was responsible for all physical phenomena. The polarity between the life force (dynamic part) and the body (somatic part) leads to the expression of life, although they were identical: "the body is the spatial form of the life force; life force is the body, which appears in the form of activity". 145 According to Carus, the same was true for the relationship between brain and soul. The consequence of their identity was that physical processes in the brain did not cause a change in the activity of the soul, which was the manifestation of identity in time, while the processes in the brain were its manifestation in space.'46 The central point in Carus's theory was that this identity was expressed by the whole brain and the indivisible soul. This meant that the action of the brain in its totality was correlated to the idea of the self, and the product of this action was consciousness or the soul. 147 At this point Carus pursued a course different from Burdach Carus's refutation of Gall is thus fundamentally different from Burdach's. While the latter had accused Gall of materialism, Carus stressed that Gall's research had started with the organ of the soul, and that he had continued by seeking more inferior organs "in order to ignore no lobe or fibre of the brain which could not be regarded as the specific organ of a particular power of the soul". 149 It seems peculiar that Carus should place Gall in the dualistic tradition in the search for the organ of the soul, with the difference that Gall had proposed not only one, but many organs. But Carus suspected that every theory primarily focusing on the human brain was directed by an erroneous metaphysical supposition, whereas he aimed to investigate the brain in its phylogenetic development.'50 This plan, however, did not include the examination of human talents and propensities. Hence the final question in Carus's book is that of "the innate psychical propensities and talents and their manifestation in the structure (Bildung) of the brain";'51 and he agreed with Rudolphi and Burdach that the differences between men were based on human freedom and the circumstances of life, and on education rather than on the size of the brain.
Burdach and Carus were in full agreement in regarding the soul as the temporal, and the brain as the spatial aspect of a unified principle. The reference to the dimensions of space and time had an epistemological background. In spite of its criticism of dualism and materialism, this naturphilosophisch brain theory represents an attempt to supersede Kant's epistemological separation of the soul and the brain. This does not mean that Burdach or Carus returned to the position against which Kant's criticism had been aimed. They accepted the dimensions of time and space, but they unified them on a higher level. Burdach, in particular, called attention to the insufficiency of the hypothesis that the soul was subject only to the inner senses.
Our consciousness tells us that our soul is individually confirmed to one specific body, that is, to specific spatial boundaries. We feel that this body belongs to our being and recognize that our soul is bound to it. The soul becomes manifest and operates by means of these very same spatial barriers.'52 Thus individuality and personality are necessarily correlated with the body, and the knowledge of its unity with the soul is the result of self-experience. Burdach was sympathetic to the investigation of the brain on the basis of the human self, and as a result he was able to establish two levels of knowledge. The metaphysical experience of the unity of the self found its complement in physiological localization, which did not undermine the unity because it did not antiquity to Descartes and to Soemmerring. The latter made a final attempt to preserve the concept of the organ of the soul by combining the methods of anatomy with certain theoretical assumptions of late eighteenth-century "vital materialism". Despite his failure, the significance of the problem was appreciated. None of the authors discussed above would have denied that the relationship of the soul to the brain was a most important issue. But in the transition from the Enlightenment to the Romantic period, the epistemological view, which was stressed by Kant and picked up and transformed by Schelling and his successors, was only one component. The relation between the size, structure, and function of the human brain and behaviour was linked to the definition of the differences between men and animals, and of men among themselves. It is generally accepted that the question of whether there were innate differences between individuals or whether they were equal was a central topic of the Enlightenment; brain anatomy was not divorced from this issue. Of course, no one denied that the formula "big is beautiful"'57 was an appropriate principle by which to distinguish between animal and man. Anatomists and anthropologists tried hard to find an effective parameter for correlating brain and species within the Chain of Being. This general agreement, however, must not be transferred to the problem of characterizing men.'58 Here we can discern the element common to scientists like Soemmerring and Gall. For both the formula "big is beautiful" was connected with the explanation of human nature. Although Gall was much more radical than Soemmerring, anatomy was absolutely necessary to both. This materialistic view was rejected with several arguments. Rudolphi stressed the methodological standpoint and argued that anatomy was not suitable to support that view. At the same time, he was in full agreement with Burdach and Carus that human behaviour was primarily a result of education and of the circumstances of life. This coalition suggests that the distinction between Naturphilosophie and empiricism is not necessarily useful. If Gall's pessimism denied the progressive perfection of mankind, then the Enlightened ideal of the equality of man united scientists who had quite opposite theories.159
Focusing on the problem of the unity and indivisibility of the soul, we see another puzzling interrelation of the different opinions. The independence of the soul was a central assumption in French dualism (Cuvier, Flourens) and in German Naturphilosophie (Burdach, Carus) . The difference seems to be that Kant's epistemological definitions stimulated further discussions in Germany, but not in France. Kant's definition forced the Naturphilosophen to consider and to accept the logical premises for distinguishing between space and time. Strictly anti-dualistic and anti-materialistic thinkers, they proposed that the brain and the soul were only two aspects of one and the same thing, namely the absolute principle. This tenet not only led to different applications in Burdach's and Carus's approaches, but also within Burdach's own work. This suggests that Naturphilosophie was a spiritus rector without absolute authority, and with a field wide enough to allow for various attempts at new orientations.160
Finally, the discussion around 1800 cannot be subsumed as the choice between localization theory and brain equipotentiality. For Burdach, the first was not the alternative to the second. Instead he combined both on the basis of Naturphilosophie and proposed two different points of view regarding the same thing. His basic aim was to avoid materialism. Meckel, on the other hand, came to a similar pragmatic conclusion by reducing the problem to anatomical and clinical observation. Nevertheless, it is true that Burdach and Meckel favoured cerebral localization, whereas Rudolphi and Carus did not. But all the physiologists examined here were influenced by Gall, and each used a completely different strategy in order to reach their conclusions. Rudolphi rejected cerebral localization on the grounds of scepticism of the validity of anatomical observations and of his psychological premises; Carus on naturphilosophisch grounds. Again, we could place Rudolphi and Carus in the category of anti-localizationists, although they had radically different positions.
Soemmerring's and Gall's concepts were discussed within various dimensions and finally rejected by a variety of arguments. This "plurality" was at least an expression of the scientific, philosophical, and political situation in early nineteenth century Germany. It demonstrates the enormousness of the theoretical enterprise required to create a methodology for explaining the phenomena of life. The soul and the brain were the most sensitive entities in this field, because understanding them not only meant understanding the world but also the self, including human thoughts and feelings.
